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The Agricultural fmergency in Iowa 
V. Control of the General Price Level 
By GEOFFREY SnEPDERD and \VALLAC£ Wa1cnT 
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND 
MECHANIC ARTS 
R. M. HUGHU, Actin11 Director 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SECTION 
AMES, IOWA 
Foreword 
The general commodity price level, after declining 34 percent 
from 1925-1929 average levels during the past three years, re-
turned to approximately pre-war levels in January, 1932. From 
then on, until September, 1932, it remained fairly stable. 
Since September, however, the general price level has been fall-
ing again at the rate of one or two points a month. How long 
the decline will continue, no one knows; but agriculture and in-
dustry can not begin to recover until the decline is arrested. The 
urgent need for some form of control of the general price level is 
steadily becoming greater. 
The present circular deals with the control of the general price 
level. It points out the need for this control, and shows what the 
Federal Reserve System has been doing to check deflation since the 
depression began. There is not space enough, however, for a pre-
sentation of some of the stronger reflationary measures that have 
recently been proposed. These measures will be presented and 
discussed iri a later circular in this series. 
This is the fifth publication in the series dealing with the pres-
ent agricultural emergency. The first circular in the series, 'The 
Situation Today," presented the main facts of the case. The 
second circular, ."The Causes of the Emergency," dealt with the 
causative factor. The third circular was entitled "The Domestic 
Allotment Plan." The fourth was entitled "The Iowa Farm 
!\fortgage Situation." The present circular, dealing with monetary 
questions, is the fifth in the series. A later circular will deal fur-
ther with the same suhject. 
The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa 
V. Control of the General Price Level 
Dy GEOFFREY Sm:rnERD and \VALLACE \VRIGllT 
Without question, one of the gravest defects in our present 
economic system is the unstable value of our money. Whenever 
the value of money changes, it works hann either to debtors or 
to creditors, and sometimes does damage to both ; it takes purchas-
ing power from one class and gives it to another, dislocates exist-
ing business relationships, and (in the case of an increase in the 
value of money) throws our whole economic machinery out of 
gear. One has only to look about him at the present time to sec 
full evidence of the terrific havoc that an abrupt change in the 
value of money can work. 
During the past 20 years, the value or purchasing power of the 
dollar has varied tremendously. If we regard the pre-war period 
as normal, we can say that before the war the dollar was worth 
100 cents. Then came the war time inffation; the value of the 
dollar in terms of the amount of goods it would buy fell to 44 
cents in 1920; it recovered part way to 68 cents by 1926, and 
finally (October, 1932) has risen to 106 cents. 
Now a change in the value of the dollar is the same thing as 
an (opposite) change in the general level of prices. If we prefer 
to talk in terms 0£ changes in the price level, we can say that the 
price level started out at 100 before the war, rose to 225 in 1920, 
fell to 151 by 1926, and from 1929 onward fell rapidly to 94 by 
October, 1932.1 
The decline in the general price level after 1920 was accom-
panied by a world-wide business depression that was severe but 
comparatively short lived. The decline in the price level that 
started in 1929 has been accompanied by a still more severe de-
pression, that is by no means short lived. It is now entering upon 
its fourth year, and no one knows when it will end. 
Effect of Declining Price Level 
A sudden decline in the general price level has a disruptive effect 
on our whole economic machinery, because all prices do not decline 
equally. The prices of raw materials decline farther than whole-
sale prices ; wholesale prices, in turn, decHne more than retail 
prices; rents and truces follow with a good deal of lag, wages 
descend rapidly in some cases and slowly in others,2 while many 
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charges-capital and interest payments on debts, railroad rates, 
etc.,-decline very slowly indeed. As a result, the productive ma-
chinery of the country is thrown out of gear and cannot work 
properly, with some classes bearing an unduly large proportion 
of the general burden; 
A decline in the general level of wholesale prices always bears 
heavily on the producers of raw materials, because the costs of 
distribution from producer to consumer do not decline as rapidly 
as other prices. The heaviest part of the burden is therefore 
passed back to the producer. Furthermore, a great decline in the 
commodity price level is generally accompanied by a business de-
pression and a general reduction in demand, and most industries 
reduce their production accordingly. But farms cannot be shut 
down part-time like factories ; in spite of the reduction in demand 
that has occurred during the present depression, agriculture has 
continued to produce as much as she did before the depression 
began.8 This has laid an additional burden on agricultural prices. 
The extent of the decline in the prices of agricultural products 
is clearly shown by the price data of the United States Department 
of Agriculture. The recent 34 percent decline in the general 
level of wholesale prices has been accompanied by a 60 percent' 
decline in average agricultural prices for the United States. For 
Iowa, the decline has been even greater; the prices of Iowa farm 
products have been cut 66 percent.G That is, Iowa farm products 
are now selling for one-third of their 1925-1929 prices.e 
Whole Price Structure Subsiding 
Are these low prices likely to improve shortly, or are they per-
haps going still lower? Opinions on this subject have been chang-
ing during the past two years. 
During the first year of the depression~ most people thought it 
was just another business cycle. The president of the United 
States called business men together in conferences in which they 
pledged themselves to maintain wages until business activity and 
prices should return to pre-depression levels. The general thought 
of the country was that the depression would be short lived, and 
that recovery would restore the conditions existing before the 
slump. People thought that the problem was simply to bridge 
the gap between the old prosperity period and the new. 
By now, however, the situation has changed. Most peopie realize 
now that this is something more than an ordinary business depres-
sion; they realize that the economic world is passing through a 
major dislocation, during which the whole commodity price struc-
ture is subsiding to a lower level. It appears that the general com-
modity price level is shifting downward to a lower range than 
that of 1922-1929. 
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Some cyclic recovery of .prices from the bottom of the depres-
sion may be expected to take place, but the disturbing thing is 
that nobody knows whether we have yet reached the bottom. The 
general price level, after falling almost continuously since 1929, 
stopped falling in June, 1932, and by September had risen more 
than a point. Observers then breathed ea-sier. They hoped trnit 
the dollar, having returned roughly· to its pre-war value, was go-
ing to stabilize at that point. But since September the general 
price level has beeJl declining again, one or two points a month.7 
As this is being written, hogs at Chicago are making a new low 
since December, 1878,8 and grain in Liverpool is smashing bottom 
records extending back 344 years.9 
We have no assurance that our general price level has yet 
reached bottom. We cannot sax. that because prices are now back 
to their pre-war levels, they will not go lower. There is no magic 
in· pre-war price levels, because monetary conditions have changed 
greatly since the war. Af~er the post-war depression, our price 
indexes le\•eled out at 150 percent of pre-war; there is nothing to 
compel them to level out now at 100. If gold is the bed rock on 
which prices will rest, and no changes art made in national credit 
policies, the outlook is not bright. Most of the world's gold now 
is sunk in the vaults of the United States· and France, and the 
Row into those countries is still continuing; gold is not exerting its 
full effect on world prices. And as for the more remote future, 
many observers10 feel that the gradual depletion of the world's 
gold mines will slowly drag price levels lower and lower, unless 
something is done to prevent it. 
THE VALUE OF MONEY 
Unless the world inte~ds to let its price levels drift up or down 
to whatever point the supply of gold, the distribution of gold, 
credit policies and other forces carry them, some form of control 
of the general price level is imperative. Since we are now suffering 
from a declining price level, such control would now be exercised 
in the direction of inflation or reflation toward the levels existing 
before the· decline began. 
The intent and purpose of reAation becomes clearer if we con-
sider for a moment what the dollar really is. 
The dollar is to the economist and the business world what the 
foot rule is to the engineer. It is the standard unit of measure, 
the yard-stick by which value is measured. Suppose that all en-
gineering foot rules had increased in size during the last three 
years so that they were now 18 inches long instead of 12 inches; 
confusion and breakdown in the engineering world would immedi-
ately result. No new machinery or implements or tools would fit 
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in with those already in operation. The obvious remedy would be, 
not to stretch the size of every product in existence to fit the 
stream of new goods made with the new 18-inch foot, but to 
shorten the foot rule down to its original length. That is what the 
reflationists purpose to do with the dollar; they propose to reduce 
its length or value or purchasing power to its previous status. 
Changing the Purchasing Power of the Dollar 
But how can this objective be achieved? How can the value 
of the dollar be reduced part way or perhaps all the way to its 
1922-1929 level? 
The reflationists answer this question by saying that as far as 
changes in its value are concerned, money is like other goods-
its value rises if the supply decreases, and falls if the supply in-
creases. They say that since a decline in the general price level 
is nothing but an evidence of an increase in the value of money, 
the thing to do is to decrease the value of money; and this can 
be accomplished by increasing its supply or quantity. 
With proper qualifications (chiefly concerning changes in ve-
locity of circulation as well as in quantity of money) this reason-
ing is sound, and price history bears it out. From the Civil \Var 
on to the 1890's, the amount of gold in the world was not increas-
ing as fast as the production of goods. The general price level 
declined steadily, culminating in the depression of 1892-96. Then 
came greaU discoveries of gold in South Africa and the Klondike, 
and the development of the cyanide process of extracting gold 
from low grade ore. A stream of new gold poured into the markets 
of the world. The general price level ceased to fall, and, instead, 
began to rise. This rise continued until the outbreak of the 
World War. 
During the World War and afterward, all of the belligerent 
nations demonstrated how inflation (i.e., increasing the quantity 
of money) can send prices sky-high. Russia and Germany allowed 
the inflation to run on until the bubble burst; the supply of their 
money was so excessive that it became worthless. France was able 
to catch herself in time to prevent disaster, but her franc now is 
worth only one-fourth of its pre-war value. England and the 
United States also inflated their currencies, but less drastically; 
the English pound and the United States dollar have now returned 
to roughly their pre-war purchasing power.11 
The argumeut is not whether inflation would raise prices; with-
out any question, it would do that. The question is whether a 
policy of inflation should be undertaken; and if it should, whether 
inflation once started could be controlled. Many observers fear 
that inflation as a remedy for the present depression would lead 
to results that would be worse than the disease; some, because they 
63 
are afraid that it would force the United States off the gold 
standard ; others, because they believe that inffation would soon 
get out of hand and go too far; and others, because they consider 
that it would not last and that sooner or later another acffation 
would follow. 
These questions should be thoughtfully considered. And since 
we are discussing monetary inffation, we must first get a clear 
understanding of what "money" is. 
Currency or Cash Money 
The business of this country is transacted with two kinds of 
money. The first kind is the everyday cash or currency that passes 
from hand to hand and back and forth over the counter. It is 
mostly paper-dollar bills, five dollar bills, and so forth-with 
some gold, silver and copper coin. The composition of this kind 
of money in circulation on Oct. 31, 1932, is shown in table I. 
TABLE I. KINDS OF MONEY IN CIRCULATION12 
(In "Millions of Dollars) 
Oct. JI, 1932 
Kind of Money Amount 
Gold coin-··---·····--············-··-· .. ·-·--··········-·····--- 445 
Silver coin ...................... --·-----·······-···-··---·-···-·- 286 
J.linor coin ················-······--······-·-------··--- 113 
Federal Reserve notes-·····--·--·--·--····---··---·...2,689 
Other notes ....... ·--·-····-·-·-···-····-··-··· .......................... .2,095 
844 
4,784 
Total money in circulatio0-...... -----·-·-···----- 5,628 
The table shows that about 85 percent of our currency in cir-
culation ordinarily consist of paper notes; the other 15 percent is 
made up of gold, silver and other coin. 
Credit Money, the Major Element 
The second kind of money is different from this physical cash 
money or currency; it is simply credit money. A merchant who 
borrows $1,000 from his bank in order to buy goods does not 
draw out the money in cash. He simply signs his note to the bank 
for $1,000 and pays for his goods by checks on the bank. No 
currency changes hands, but $1,000 of credit money came into 
being when he raised the loan, and that $1,000 of credit money 
disappeared when he sold his goods and paid back his loan. 
This kind of money-credit money-is just as real as cash 
money ; and in its effect on prices it is many times as important 
as cash money, because there is about 10 times as much of it in use. 
Let us see what changes have taken place in the amounts of 
these two kinds of money since the depression began. We can call 
the first kind cash money or currency to distinguish it from the 
second kind, the credit money. 
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Fig. 1. Chang.ea in the volume 0£ money. 
The changes that have taken place in our cash money are shown 
by the lower line in fig. 1. This chart shows that currency in cir-
culation increased from about 4.5 billion dollars in 1930 to 5.0 
billion dollars in 1931. In 1932 it increased to 5.5 billion doUars.11 
From 1930 on, currency -increased 20 percent, yet prices fell. 
Why was this? 
In the first place, a large quantity of this currency was hoarded. 
It went into hiding aild was never put to work. In the second 
place, numerous bank failures were taking place, and a good many 
.communities were using cash in place of checks. And third, sub-
stantial quantities of cash were kept on hand by banks who had 
to keep their assets liquid because of the uncertainty in the minds 
of their depositors. . . 
· · But the chief reason why the movement of prices and of the 
volume of currency did not correspond is that currency is only a 
small element in our total money. Only about one-tenth of our 
total payments in this countrjr are made in currency; the other 
nine-tenths arc made by check.u When we look at the figures 
showing the changes that have taken place in our credit money 
during the last three years, we find that this credit money has 
decreased -from 53 billions in the second ha1£ of 1930 to about 
42 billions in the middle of 1932.15 This means that during the 
·last 2 years, 11 billion dollars of this credit money has disappeared. 
This situation is shown by the upper tine in fig. 1. 
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Moderate increases in the quantity of currency in circulation 
evidently do not increase prices. Prices since 1930 have steadily 
declined, in the face of a substantial increase of currency in cir-
culation. It is evidently the total volume Of all kinds of money-
currency plus credit money :-that counts,18 not the volume of 
currency alone. 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
In normal times, the most important agency for controlling 
the volume of currency and credit-i. e., the volume of money-
is the Federal 'Reserve Banking System. The leading nations of 
the world each have a central bank at the head of their banking 
systems. In the United States, our central bank is the group of 12 
Federal Reserve Banks located in different parts of the country. 
Our Federal Reserve System, like ~he central banks of other 
nations, has two means of controlling the volume of money out-
standing. 
Control of the Discount Rate 
The first means is the raising or lowering of the discount rate. 
This discount rate is the rate of interest that the central bank-
in our case, the group of 12 Federal Reserve Banks-charges the 
ordinary city or country banks for funds it loans out to them. A 
country bank charges interest on the money or credit it lends to 
farmers, storekeepers and other individual borrowers; similarly, 
the Federal Reserve Bank charges interest on the money it lends 
to these banks. The rate of interest that it charges is called the 
discount rate. 
Ordinarily, when a city or country bank lowers the rate of 
interest it charges its borrowers, these borrowers borrow more ; 
when it raises the rate o{ interest, they borrow less. Money is like 
other things; if the price of a year's use of money (the interest 
rate) rises, people wilt take less of it; if the interest rate falls, 
they will take more, and the volume of money will expand. (In 
the case of money as with other goods, these statements hold true 
only if no changes take place in the demand. Large changes in 
demand may operate to more than offset changes in the interest 
rate. This is discussed fully later.) 
Open-Market Operations 
The second method of expanding or contracting the amount oE 
credit money in the country is referred to as the "open-market 
operations of the Federal Reserve Banks." This is a formidable 
sounding phrase, but the thing described is really simple. When 
the Federal Reserve Banks find that credit money is contracting, 
and · be1ieve that this contraction should be stopped, they go into 
the open .market for United States securities and buy up large 
quantities of them from the regular city and country banks. The 
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money which the Federal Reserve Banks pay these regular banks 
builds up the reserves of idle money of the regular banks. 
Now banks do not like to have idle money lying unused and 
drawing no interest. The regular banks, accordingly, extend more 
credit, make more loans to their local customers. In ordinary 
times they can lend out 10 times as much as their reserves. This 
means that if a bank has sold $10,000 of United States securities 
to the Federal Resen·e Bank, it now has $10,000 more reserves 
and can lend out $100,000 more than it could before; $90,000 of 
additional credit money has been created and "pumped into the 
country." · 
Conversely, when the F~deral Reserve System thinks that credit 
money is expanding and should be contracted, it sells United 
States securities in the open market. Country and city banks all 
over the country buy them up. Hut this buying reduces the re-
serves of the country and city banks. If a bank buys $10,000 of 
United States securities, it has to reduce its loans to its local cus-
tomers by $100,000; in that process $90,000 of credit money is 
destroyed. Thus do the "open-market operations" of the Federal 
Reserve Banks effect an expansion or contraction of credit money. 
· These two methods, raising or lowering the discount rate and 
buying .or selling United States securities in the open market, are 
generally used in conjunction; the one reinforces the other. Cen-
tral banks in Europe have used this control of the discount' rate 
for generations. The Federal Reserve Banks in this country have 
been using both methods since the Federal Reserve System was 
set up in 1913. Bankers in this country have not had as much 
experience with credit control as European bankers have, but they· 
have been gaining it. The job requires skill rather than effort. It 
is like driving an automobile along a highway. Under ordinary 
circumstances, a touch on the wheel now and then is all that is 
required to keep the automobile in the road; but the driver must 
keep constantly on the watch, otherwise small errors in· direction 
will accumulate and the machine will leave the road. 
The Federal Reserve System Has Tried to Check Deflation 
The Federal Reserve System has been making use of these 
credit control methods during the present depression. 
During the 1928 and 1929 boom, the Federal Reserve System 
repeatedly issued warnings, and raised the New York discount 
rate slowly from 4 to 5 and finally to 6 percent. They also sold 
large quantities of United States securities. The general banking 
and business world, however, did not pay much attention to these 
actions; some prominent bankers, indeed, opposed them. 
Then came the stock-market crash in October, 1929, and the 
beginning.of the depression. The Federal Reserve System reversed 
its policy and began a program of "easy money." The reserve 
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banks started reducing their discount rates. On Nov. 1, the New 
York Federal Reserve Bank lowered its rate from 6 to 5 percent; 
thereafter it continued to reduce it steadily, half a point at a time, 
until by May, 1931, the rate was 1.5 percent. This was the lowest 
rate in its history. 
The Boston, Chicago and Atlanta Federal Reserve Banks were 
less· prompt and vigorous; they reduced their rates only half a 
point, and that not until near the end of 1929. The rest of the 
12 banks took no action until February, 1930, when they cut their 
discount rates half a point. Thereafter they all continued to 
reduce their rates until the early part of 1931; .by that time they 
were all down to 2.5 or 3 percent, and that was as low as they got. 
After October, 1931, the banks all began to raise their rates 
again.11 
The reserve banks also used the second method of checking 
credit deflation, namely, open-market operations. During 1929 
they had sold nearly all of their holdings of United States securi-
ties in an attempt to curb speculative inflation; in the second and 
third quarters of 1929 their holdings of these securities amounted 
to only 150 millions. Immediately after the initial stock market 
crash in 1929 they reversed their policy and started buying heavily. 
Before the· end of the year they held 500 million of United States 
securities. By the third quarter of 1931 they held over 700 
million.18 
International Complications Set In 
In normal times these measures should have resulted in an ex-
pansion of credit money in the country of 6 or 7 billion dollars. 
If the United States were as much isolated from the rest of the 
world economically as it is geographically, these activities of the 
Federal Reserve Board might have played a large part in over-
coming the depression. But in 1931, undermined by the effects of 
two years of depression, the weakened financial structure of sev-
eral European countries gave way. In rapid succession Austria, 
Germany and England were forced off the gold standard. Euro-
peans even began to fear lest the United States should be driven 
off the gold standard also~ Precipitately they drew gold out of the 
United States, exactly as depositors make a run on a local bank 
when they think it is getting shaky-thereby often bringing on 
that which they fear. The international run on the United States 
drained 700 million dollars of gold-almost as much as the entire 
British stock-out of the country in two months. The stocks of 
gold in the United States were so large that we met these heavy 
drafts without difficulty, but the shock to our confidence was 
severe. 
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The Glass-Steagall Bill Releases Tied-up Gold 
The situation had elements of danger in it. People in this coun-
try were afraid of the banks, and in that fear they began to hoard 
currency. Much of our gold was tied up as backing for Federal 
Reserve notes (currency), which ordinarily are backed by 
40 percent gold and 60 percent commercial paper. The amount 
of commercial paper available, however, had become less than 
60 percent of the notes outstanding; so the banks were being 
forced to increase the gold cover of their notes above 40 percent, 
to fill the gap. 
The danger was that, if the hoarding of currency should in-
crease, more Federal Reserve notes would have to be issued, and 
lhat would tie up more gold-perhaps enough to embarrass us 
should another international run be made on the United States. 
Early in 1932, therefore, the Glass-Steagall Bill19 was enacted 
into law, stipulating that the Federal Reserve Banks could use 
United States securities in place of commercial paper as 60 
percent backing for notes, whenever there was not enough com-
mercial paper to go around. This bill made it possible to free 
large quantities of gold (previously tied up as backing for Federal 
Reserve notes) if necessary to nieet foreign runs; it also per-
mitted the Federal Reserve Banks to buy up much larger quantities 
of United States securities than had ever been anticipated before. 
In April, 1932, therefore, the buying of United States securi-
ties was resumed on an unprecedented scale. Holdings rose from 
809 millions in March to over 1,800 millions in July.2° Since then 
they have remained roughly constant at about 1,850 millions--
that is, at nearly 2 billion dollars. 
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
From 1931 on, some weak points began to show up in our credit 
structure. Many banks had been caught with "frozen assets"-
mortgages and bonds that were good but could not be turned into 
cash quickly enough to meet the demand for liquid funds. To 
meet this situation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was 
formed in January, 1932, with a capital of 500 million dollars sub-
scribed by the United States Treasury. Its purpose was to render 
frozen assets liquid. By the end of September, 1932, the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation had authorized loans to the amount 
of 1,410 million dollars, nearly three times the amount of its orig-
inal public capital, the additional amounts coming from private 
sources. Banks received 850 million dollars of this total ; railroads 
got 264 million; building and loan assocjations, and mortgage and 
insurance companies got 247 million; laM banks and other agri-
cultural credit institutions got 45 million.21 
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Ordinary Methods Not Effective Now 
This is the record of the efforts of the Federal Reserve Banking 
System and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to promote 
reflation, or at least to check deflation. It can be objected that the 
Federal Reserve System did not move quickly enough nor de-
cisively enough; but after it did start, it carried the regular 
methods of credit control to extremes never heard of before. 
What has been the result? The Federal Reserve System bas 
performed a real service in checking deflation and reducing or at 
least postponing some liquidation. But the blunt fact remains that 
as far as raising the price level is concerned the results are nil. 
Indeed, although the general price level flattened out from May 
to September of this year, it is now declining again. 
What is the trouble? Why have these measures not "taken 
hold?" 
The reason is that the forces of deflation are too powerful and 
widespread for the ordinary methods of bank credit inflation to 
take effect. We have said that these methods are like steering an 
automobile, in that ordinarily only a touch on the wheel is needed 
to keep the machine on the road. There is a further resemblance 
-these measures will not work if some obstruction pushes the 
machine off the road entirely. If you ar~ driving an automobile 
and meet a heavy truck that forces you off the road into a muddy 
ditch, skillful handling of the controls may keep you from over-
turning, but it will not get you out. 
That is roughly the situation the country is in at the present 
time. The world dislocations outlined in Circular No. II of this 
series have forced our economic machine off the highway. Ordi-
narily, the supply of credit is the factor that controls the volume 
of money and the general price level ; but at the present time the 
limiting factor is not the supply of credit but the demand for it. 
There is plenty .,f credit in the banking system, but the bankers 
are afraid to let go of it and people are afraid to take hold of it. 
Even when a manufacturer can persuade a banker to make him a 
loan, there is no profit in borrowing money to make automobiles, 
radios, furniture, etc., if the goods cannot be sold after they 
are made. 
In ordinary times, producers and consumers keep calling for 
more credit or purchasing power than the banking system can 
supply. When the supply of bank credit or purchasing power is 
inC"reased, then, it is taken in tenfold amounts by the general 
public; general purchasing power and demand is increased, and 
prices rise. But now the general public's demand for funds or 
credit or purchasing power is less than the supply; so measures 
for increasing the supply do not have their usual effect on price 
levels. 
70 
Reflation Has Not Yet Been Attempted 
The ordinary methods of bank credit inflation are incompetent 
to deal with a major price decline such as that which we are now 
going through. They amount to nothing more than an attempt 
to check deflation. In times like the present, they cannot be con-
sidered as reflationary measures; they are only anti-deflationary. 
The conclusion to be drawn is not that reflation has been tried 
and found impossible; the fact of the matter is that reflation has 
not yet been attempted. If we want reflation, we must tum to 
stronger measures. 
Several different methods of attaining inflation and reaching the· 
ultimate goal of stabilization of the value of money are being advo-
cated by leading authorities. These measures will be presented 
and discussed in a Jater publication in this series. 
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